

Mental Health of Immigrants in the UK

Immigrant communities in the UK face significant mental health challenges, with higher prevalence of conditions such as depression, anxiety, and PTSD compared to host populations ¹. Many refugees, asylum seekers, and other vulnerable migrant groups have endured trauma (e.g. war, persecution or human trafficking) that elevates their risk of mental disorders ² ³. For example, a study of trafficking survivors found **78% of women and 40% of men** screened positive for PTSD, depression or anxiety ³, illustrating the severe psychological toll in certain migrant subgroups. Yet despite greater need, immigrants often struggle to access care: language barriers, stigma, uncertain legal status and fear of being reported deter many from seeking mental health services ⁴ ⁵. These barriers contribute to underuse of NHS mental health care by migrants, even though those who pay the health surcharge (and other vulnerable groups) are entitled to free NHS treatment ⁶.

Globally and in the UK, migrants' mental health is shaped by stressors at every stage of migration. Pre-migration trauma (conflict, persecution), hardships during the journey, and post-migration challenges (family separation, poor living conditions, discrimination) all compound psychological distress ⁷ ⁸. **Refugees and asylum seekers are especially at risk**, with research showing they have higher rates of depression and PTSD than the general population ⁹. The COVID-19 pandemic further exacerbated risk factors for migrant mental health – worsening isolation, job insecurity, and living conditions for many ¹⁰. On a positive note, studies indicate that over time many immigrants' acute distress can improve, especially with strong community support and culturally sensitive services ¹¹ ¹². However, sustained efforts are needed to reduce barriers to care. Initiatives like community-based outreach and "embedded" mental health workers have shown success in building trust and connecting migrants to services ¹³ ¹⁴. Overall, immigrant mental health in the UK is a critical concern: they carry higher burdens of trauma-related illness but often receive less care, pointing to an urgent gap in equitable healthcare access. (Notably, despite these elevated risks in vulnerable groups, migrants on average report somewhat better health than UK-born people – a **"healthy migrant effect"** – because many economic migrants are young and healthy. In 2019 only 5% of foreign-born residents reported a long-term mental health condition vs 10% of UK-born, though asylum-seekers and refugees are a clear exception to this trend ¹⁵ ¹⁶.)

Alcohol Abuse and Protest-Related Drinking

Alcohol abuse remains a widespread issue in the UK and can be especially problematic in contexts of mass gatherings, protests, or unrest. After decades of high alcohol consumption (the UK's per capita drinking peaked in 2004 at 9.5 liters – about **100 bottles of wine per person per year**), Britain is still dealing with the consequences: alcohol-specific deaths topped **10,000 in 2022**, a 33% jump since 2019 ¹⁷. This heavy drinking culture often spills into public events. Government advisors note that alcohol consumption contributes to disorder at **public gatherings including protests**, particularly when rallies occur near pubs or during sports events ¹⁸. Intoxicated individuals in a protest crowd can become aggressive or defy police, increasing the risk of violence. Indeed, police planning documents during COVID-19 cautioned that reopening pubs on **"Independence Day"** 4 July 2020, combined with football matches, would likely result in fans and protesters gathering drunk in city centres, creating "flashpoints" for unrest ¹⁹ ²⁰.

Real-world incidents underscore the link between alcohol and protest violence. For example, at anti-immigration rallies in August 2025, police in Liverpool arrested 11 people for offenses including **being drunk and disorderly**, as well as assault ²¹. Similarly, far-right demonstrations in London have infamously involved participants drinking heavily and clashing with police – observers described some extremist protesters as “thugs” doing Nazi salutes and getting intoxicated on war memorials ²². Such scenes reflect how alcohol misuse can fuel hate and chaos during tense rallies. More broadly, research on crowd psychology shows that alcohol lowers inhibitions and increases risky, aggressive behavior ²⁰. This means that when large groups gather under emotional or political tension, heavy drinking can act as an accelerant – turning a peaceful protest into a violent confrontation or riot. British authorities have acknowledged this risk: **public health messaging** now emphasizes responsible drinking around big events, and police are advised to work with pub owners to prevent alcohol-fueled disorder ²³ ²⁴. In summary, alcohol abuse in the UK is not just a private health issue but a public order concern, as seen in the volatile mix of booze and political unrest.

Racism Indicators: Hate Crimes, Discrimination, and Exclusion

Racism remains a pressing problem in the UK, evidenced by multiple indicators from crime data to workplace surveys. **Hate crime** statistics show thousands of racist or other bias-motivated offenses occur each year. In the 12 months to March 2024, police in England and Wales recorded **140,561 hate crimes**, of which around 70% (98,799 offenses) were motivated by race or ethnicity ²⁵ ²⁶. While overall hate crime reports fell 5% from the previous year, there was a **surge in religious hate crimes (+25%)** – largely driven by a spike in antisemitic and Islamophobic incidents during the Israel–Hamas conflict in late 2023 ²⁷. This illustrates how global events can unleash bursts of bigotry domestically. Despite short-term fluctuations, the long-term trend has been rising hate incidents since the 2010s (partly due to better reporting and recording). Minority communities also experience disproportionate victimization: among racially/religiously aggravated hate crime victims whose ethnicity was recorded, **31% were Asian and 23% Black**, far exceeding those groups’ population shares (Asians are 9.3% of England/Wales, Blacks 4.0%) ²⁸. By contrast, White people (82% of the population) comprised only 30.6% of these hate crime victims ²⁸. This indicates people of color are far more likely to be targets of hate-fueled harassment, violence, or abuse – a stark indicator of ongoing racism.

Beyond crime, evidence of **racial discrimination in workplaces and daily life** abounds. In a 2024 survey of 4,000 UK adults, **1 in 11 people (9.3%)** reported personally experiencing racial or ethnic discrimination in employment (as a job applicant or at work) ²⁹. Among non-white respondents, however, the rate was much higher – about **1 in 3 (34%)** had faced racism in hiring or on the job ²⁹. These findings align with other research showing ethnic minority Britons consistently report higher rates of unfair treatment. For instance, government data show employment outcomes lag for minorities: the unemployment rate for ethnic minorities is roughly double that of white Britons (in recent years ~13% vs ~6%) ³⁰. Pay gaps persist too – Black workers with university degrees earn **23% less on average** than white graduates ³⁰. In surveys, more than half of minority employees say they feel they must work harder to be valued equally, and **over 60% of women of color** report experiencing bias or uncomfortable treatment in recruitment processes ²⁹. Structural inequalities born of racism also appear in socioeconomic stats: ethnic minority families are more likely to be low-income or in insecure jobs, contributing to a higher poverty rate. About **35.7% of people from ethnic minorities live in poverty, versus 17.2% of White people** – a more than two-fold difference ³¹. Minorities are also more often in overcrowded housing (e.g. 27% of Black Britons vs 8% of Whites) ³² and face higher risks of school exclusion and criminal justice disparities ³³ ³⁴.

Together, these indicators paint a picture of entrenched racial inequity. Hate crimes reflect blatant hostility that many minorities encounter, while workplace and economic data show more insidious forms of exclusion and disparity. Social exclusion can take subtler forms too: surveys find minorities frequently feel unsafe or avoid certain places due to their background (in one study, 19% of migrants in Britain felt unsafe and 10% avoided public spaces for fear of racism) ³⁵. The **mental health toll** of racism is significant – enduring discrimination is linked with stress, depression, and poorer self-rated health in minority populations ³⁶ ³⁷. In sum, by quantitative measures (crime, income, employment) and lived experience, racism remains a systemic problem in the UK. While progress has been made in equality laws, these statistics underscore the need for continued action against hate and bias, and for policies to close racial gaps in opportunity and well-being.

Community Trauma from Large Rallies and Unrest

Large rallies marked by political or cultural tension can have profound psychological and community health impacts. When mass protests, riots, or demonstrations erupt – especially if they turn violent or polarizing – the effects ripple far beyond the event. One striking example is the **August 2011 riots** in England, which followed a police shooting and spread across multiple cities. Research by Sussex University using happiness and stress data from thousands of Britons found that the 2011 riots caused a **substantial drop in well-being nationwide**, even in regions with no riots ³⁸ ³⁹. Stress and unhappiness spiked not only in London boroughs that saw looting and arson, but **across the entire country** – with notably larger negative impact in communities with higher Black populations ⁴⁰. In neighborhoods that experienced rioting, the decline in average mood was as large (in absolute terms) as the usual uplift people feel on Christmas Eve ³⁹. These negative psychological effects persisted for weeks after the unrest ended ⁴¹. In response to the turmoil, people also changed behaviors: the study noted increased **information-seeking and communication**, such as more TV news watching and social media use, as citizens tried to make sense of the chaos ⁴². Essentially, an event like the riots functioned as a collective trauma, elevating anxiety and disrupting daily life far and wide.

The psychological toll of large-scale protests or clashes can be severe, especially for minority and marginalized groups who may feel directly targeted or threatened. Communities living near the flashpoints often report lingering fear, mistrust of authorities, and “walking on eggshells” in the aftermath. For instance, after violent far-right protests or racist riots, local minority residents can experience heightened anxiety, sleep problems, and even symptoms of **PTSD** from feeling under siege ³⁷ ⁴³. Even those watching from afar may feel a vicarious trauma – as seen in 2011, people across England who never left their homes still felt distress knowing their society was in upheaval ³⁸ ⁴⁴. There can also be community-wide impacts on cohesion and trust. Large polarizing rallies (such as tense standoffs between anti-immigrant demonstrators and anti-racist counter-protesters) often leave behind a residue of division. Residents report reduced trust in neighbors, greater perception of societal fracture, and in some cases withdrawal from community activities due to fear of conflict. On the other hand, there can be **complex or even positive effects** for some: the Sussex study noted that in the most economically deprived areas, a minority of people actually showed *increased* happiness during the 2011 riots, possibly feeling schadenfreude or empathy with the rioters’ frustration at “the system” ⁴⁵. Such cases are exceptions, however. Public health experts emphasize that the net impact of violent or hate-fueled rallies is harmful to community mental health. The **collective stress** can manifest in higher incidence of depression, anxiety, and social isolation in affected areas ⁴⁶.

In light of this, there have been calls to treat the aftermath of large unrest as a public health concern. Researchers suggest providing trauma support and counseling to affected communities, much as one

would after a natural disaster ⁴⁶ . Strengthening community networks is also crucial to help people process the event together and avoid long-term scars. The lesson is that rallies with intense political or cultural conflict do more than make headlines – they can inflict invisible wounds on the psyche of a society. Monitoring and addressing those psychological impacts (the “riot shock,” so to speak) is increasingly recognized as part of the response, alongside repairing physical damage. Ultimately, preventing such violent escalations in the first place – through dialogue, policing strategies, and addressing root grievances – would best protect community well-being.

Immigration as an Economic Lifeline

Immigration plays a vital role in the UK’s economy and its capitalist system, helping to meet labor market needs, support an aging population, bolster the tax base, and sustain the education sector. **Migrants currently make up about one-fifth of the UK workforce.** As of late 2024, roughly 19% of employees (5.75 million workers) in Britain were born abroad ⁴⁷ . This includes many filling essential jobs: migrants are over-represented in sectors like **health and social care, hospitality, and food production** ⁴⁸ . For example, around **11.8% of NHS staff are foreign-born**, including a significant proportion of doctors and nurses ⁴⁹ . These workers are crucial for public services – the NHS and care homes would struggle without migrant staff. Likewise, industries from agriculture (reliant on seasonal migrant labor) to tech and finance (which attract global talent) depend on immigration to alleviate skill shortages.

Britain’s **aging population** makes immigration increasingly important. The UK birth rate has fallen to historic lows (1.44 children per woman in 2022) and life expectancy is rising ⁵⁰ ⁵¹ . This means fewer young native workers supporting more retirees, straining pension and healthcare systems. Migrants, who tend to be younger and of working age when they arrive, help counterbalance this demographic crunch. They contribute to the workforce and tax revenues, slowing the rise of the old-age dependency ratio ⁵² ⁵³ . The Office for National Statistics notes that high net migration can **delay population aging** (by bringing in younger adults who often also have higher fertility rates), although it won’t halt the trend entirely ⁵⁴ . One analysis found that without immigration, the UK would need to raise the retirement age to 71 within two decades to sustain the pension system – highlighting how migrants are an “economic lifeline” keeping the worker-to-pensioner ratio more manageable ⁵⁵ ⁵⁶ . In short, migrants are filling the gap left by declining native birthrates, doing jobs that might otherwise go unfilled, and thus maintaining productivity and services in an aging society.

Crucially, **immigrants also provide a net boost to public finances and economic growth.** Far from being a drain, most migrants contribute more in taxes than they consume in public services. On average, a migrant worker in the UK pays about **£78,000 more into the Treasury than they take out** over their lifetime ⁵⁷ . Because many arrive as healthy young adults, they benefit the tax base immediately and often leave or return home before they grow old and draw pensions or extensive healthcare ⁵⁸ . The aggregate impact is significant: estimates suggest that foreign-born workers account for tens of billions of pounds in economic output. In fact, roughly **20% of UK GDP** can be linked to immigrant labor, with one report calculating an £87 billion annual contribution by migrant employees ⁵⁶ . These figures reinforce that immigration supports the UK’s **capitalist framework by expanding the labor supply**, spurring entrepreneurship (migrants are more likely to start businesses, contributing to innovation and job creation), and injecting demand into the economy (migrant households buy goods, pay rent, etc., stimulating growth). Certain regional economies in Britain have been revitalized by inflows of international students and skilled professionals, who bring spending and know-how.

Another key dimension is the **student economy**. The UK is a top destination for international students, who not only enrich campus life but also bring huge financial benefits. In 2021–22, overseas students

boosted the UK economy by an estimated **£42 billion** in direct and knock-on effects ⁵⁹. After accounting for the public costs associated with students (like any usage of services), their net contribution was about £37.4 billion – meaning international students put in almost 10 times what they cost ⁶⁰. This translates to an average gain of **£58 million per parliamentary constituency**, or about £560 per UK resident, thanks to tuition fees, housing, and local spending by students and their visiting families ⁶¹. Universities have become increasingly dependent on higher-paying non-EU students to fund research and operations, especially after domestic tuition fees were capped. In addition, many foreign graduates stay on as skilled workers, plugging gaps in industries like engineering, IT, and healthcare. Thus, Britain's higher education sector and its knowledge economy are heavily propped up by global mobility. In summary, immigration intersects with the UK's economic needs on multiple fronts: shoring up the labor force, offsetting unfavorable demographics, expanding the tax and consumer base, and sustaining world-class universities. Most economists agree that, overall, immigration is an engine of growth and a pillar supporting Britain's capitalist prosperity ⁴⁹. Without it, the country would face labor shortages, a steeper aging crisis, and fiscal challenges in funding public services.

Immigration: Rhetoric vs Reality in Policy

In recent years, a striking gap has often emerged between UK government rhetoric on immigration and the actual data on migration flows and policies. Politically, the discourse (especially under previous Conservative governments) has been dominated by promises to **“take back control”** of borders and reduce immigration sharply – yet in practice, immigration numbers reached record highs. For much of the 2010s, Conservative leaders repeatedly vowed to bring net migration down to the “tens of thousands” per year. This target (under 100,000 annually) was even a formal government goal from 2010 to 2019 ⁶². However, it was never met. Net migration – the difference between long-term immigrants and emigrants – fluctuated between ~200,000 and 300,000 throughout the 2010s ⁶³. It then **surged post-Brexit**, hitting an all-time high of **906,000** in the year ending June 2023 (driven by non-EU students, skilled workers, and refugees from Ukraine and Hong Kong) ⁶⁴. By 2024 net migration was estimated at **431,000**, lower than the peak but still well above the levels of a decade prior ⁶⁵. In other words, despite tough talk and tighter rules on EU free movement after Brexit, overall migration remained historically elevated – largely because the UK simultaneously opened new routes (for global talent, trade deals, and humanitarian cases) and faced labor demands that kept visa issuance high ⁶⁶ ⁶⁷. The Conservative government ultimately abandoned the “tens of thousands” target in 2019 because it proved unworkable ⁶², and the current Labour government (elected 2024) explicitly refuses to set a numerical target, acknowledging that rigid caps are impractical ⁶⁸.

This divergence between rhetoric and reality is also evident in asylum policy. Ministers have frequently used stark rhetoric about **“stopping the boats”** of undocumented Channel migrants and portrayed asylum seekers as an out-of-control problem. In 2022–2023, the government introduced hardline measures like the Rwanda deportation scheme and the Illegal Migration Act, accompanied by slogans about cracking down on “bogus” refugees. Yet **actual asylum statistics** tell a nuanced story: asylum applications hit a modern record of **108,000 claims in 2024**, the highest annual number on record ⁶⁹, and the backlog of pending asylum cases swelled to tens of thousands. (At end of 2024, around 91,000 applications were still awaiting an initial decision, reflecting severe administrative delays ⁷⁰.) These record highs occurred even as the government talked tough, suggesting that harsh rhetoric did not deter people fleeing war and persecution. In fact, much of the recent surge was due to genuine crises (e.g. refugees from Afghanistan, Syria, Sudan, etc.), which the UK had committed to help. Meanwhile, legal labour and student migration also climbed to new peaks after Brexit. The government quietly expanded work visa issuances – for example, adding care workers to skill visa eligibility in 2022 due to NHS shortages ⁷¹ – even as it publicly emphasized reduction. **Student visas** too rose significantly (until

new restrictions were announced in late 2023 on bringing dependents), reflecting universities' recruitment of more international students to compensate for lost EU enrollments ⁶⁷ .

In essence, there has been a **pattern of political messaging promising a clampdown**, contrasted with policy outcomes that are more accommodating to economic and humanitarian needs. Public concerns about immigration have been met with populist promises (for instance, "British jobs for British workers" rhetoric, or claims that Brexit would drastically cut migration). But actual data post-Brexit showed **non-EU immigration ballooning**, and even EU net migration turned negative as many Europeans left, Britain still experienced high overall inflows ⁷² . This was partly intentional – the post-2021 points-based system made it easier for non-Europeans to come work or study, aligning with business and university interests. By 2022–2023 the UK had *more* foreign students and work permit holders than ever, even as politicians decried "too many immigrants." The government has lately acknowledged the inconsistency: in late 2023 it tightened some visa rules (raising salary thresholds, limiting family visas) to signal responsiveness to public pressure ⁷³ . And in 2025 the new administration proposed further cuts (e.g. closing certain work visa routes) aiming to reduce yearly visas by ~98,000 ⁷⁴ . Still, structural factors – labor shortages, aging demographics, global crises – exert strong upward pressure on migration that simplistic rhetoric fails to address. Notably, **official forecasts have consistently underestimated migration** – over the past 20 years, projections assumed lower numbers than what transpired ⁷⁵ – indicating that political wishful thinking often collides with reality.

In summary, UK immigration policy has often been characterized by a **"say one thing, do another"** dynamic. While government messaging to the public emphasizes strict control and reduction, actual policy outcomes have delivered sustained high immigration, reflecting the country's economic reliance on migrants and its international obligations. This contrast has sometimes fueled public cynicism, but it also highlights the complexity of managing migration in a globalized world. The rhetoric vs reality gap suggests that evidence-based planning – rather than arbitrary targets – is needed for coherent immigration policy. As it stands, Britain's **political narrative** on immigration has yet to fully reconcile with the **empirical trends** and needs driving immigration in practice ⁷⁶ ⁶⁶ .

Historical Legacies: Slavery, Power, and Inequality

Modern UK society still bears the imprint of historical power imbalances – notably the legacy of colonialism and slavery – in its patterns of trauma and socioeconomic inequality. During the 17th–19th centuries, the British Empire's global dominance and slave-based economy created profound and enduring effects. The wealth extracted through the **slave trade and plantation slavery** enriched British institutions and elites, laying foundations for industrial growth but also entrenching racial hierarchies and disparities ⁷⁷ ⁷⁸ . When Britain abolished slavery in 1833, the government compensated slaveowners huge sums (equivalent to billions today), yet enslaved people received nothing – a transfer of wealth that helped perpetuate White advantage and Black poverty. These historic injustices set the stage for inequalities that have been handed down across generations.

One major concept is **intergenerational trauma** stemming from slavery and racial subjugation. Scholars argue that the trauma of slavery – the violence, dehumanization and family destruction endured by enslaved Africans – did not end with emancipation, but lives on culturally and psychologically among their descendants ⁷⁹ ⁸⁰ . This is similar to how other groups (e.g. Indigenous peoples colonized or Holocaust survivors' families) exhibit collective trauma symptoms long after the original atrocities. In the UK context, many Black Britons are part of diasporas from the Caribbean or Africa that were scarred by slavery and colonial rule. The **cultural trauma of enslavement** can

manifest as internalized feelings of hopelessness, marginalization, or mistrust of authorities – which, combined with ongoing racism, contribute to disparate health and social outcomes ⁴³ ⁸⁰ . Studies in the US (and applicable by extension) have found that African-descended populations suffer higher rates of chronic stress-related illnesses, like hypertension and mental health disorders, partly due to the cumulative trauma of slavery and discrimination ³⁶ ³⁷ . In the UK, Black African and Caribbean communities similarly face elevated risks: for example, **Black African women are far more likely to be detained under mental health laws** (reported at seven times the rate of White women) ⁸¹ , and Black Britons have higher rates of certain psychiatric conditions – statistics some link to the stresses of racial trauma past and present.

Economically, **power shifts and exploitation during the colonial era translated into today's inequities**. The empire was built on extraction – of resources and labor – from colonized regions, which enriched Britain while impoverishing those regions. Even after decolonization, that imbalance persisted in the form of global inequalities and migration flows (people from former colonies moving to the UK seeking the prosperity denied to their homelands). Within the UK, descendants of formerly colonized or enslaved groups often started at severe socioeconomic disadvantage when they migrated in the post-war period (e.g. the **Windrush generation** of Caribbean Britons arrived to fill labor shortages but faced racism and exclusion in housing, jobs, and citizenship rights). This initial inequality has proven difficult to fully overcome. We see its effects in, for instance, the fact that **ethnic minority households (especially of African, Caribbean, Pakistani or Bangladeshi heritage) have lower median wealth and are more likely to be in poverty** than White British households ⁸² . As noted earlier, nearly 36% of ethnic minorities live in poverty vs 17% of Whites ⁸² , a gap rooted in historical marginalization and persisting through labor market discrimination and unequal opportunities.

Furthermore, Britain's colonial history included the subjugation of India, the Middle East, Africa, and others – experiences that left deep social scars. Trauma can be “transmitted” through generations not just biologically but through storytelling, community memory, and institutional bias. For example, South Asian communities in the UK may carry memories of partition or colonial violence that shape their trust in government or need for community solidarity. The **power dynamics of empire** also established stereotypes and systemic biases (like the idea of White Britons as rulers and people of color as “subjects”) that survive subtly in modern institutions. This is evident in ongoing systemic racism – minorities being underrepresented in positions of power (only ~8.8% of senior civil servants are non-white, versus ~14% of the population ⁸³) and overrepresented in prisons or low-pay sectors ⁸⁴ ⁸⁵ . The criminal justice system's disparities (higher stop-and-search and prosecution rates for Black Britons) harken back to a history of treating minorities as threats or second-class citizens ⁸⁴ . Likewise, educational gaps (such as lower university admission rates for Black Caribbean youth ⁸⁶) can be tied to intergenerational disadvantage.

It's important to note that British society has undergone **power shifts** in the sense that previously oppressed peoples now demand and gain more rights (e.g. civil rights movements, anti-racist legislation). There is greater awareness of colonial crimes – institutions like the Church of England, universities, even the Bank of England have started to reckon with their slavery links. The **Scott Trust (owner of *The Guardian*) issued an apology in 2023** upon finding the newspaper's 19th-century founders had ties to slavery, and it launched a reparative justice programme ⁷⁷ ⁷⁸ . Such steps show a shifting narrative: those who once had unchecked power are being confronted with historical truth, and those who suffered are being heard. Nonetheless, the healing of historical trauma is slow. Activists argue for measures like reparations or targeted investment in Black communities to address slavery's enduring harm ⁸⁷ ⁸⁸ . At minimum, acknowledging the link between past and present is crucial.

In summary, **slavery and colonialism's legacy in modern UK** is seen in who holds wealth and health, and who does not. The elite families and institutions that profited from imperial exploits set up a

stratified society. Today's socioeconomic inequality – where minorities often start on unequal footing – and some of the psychological challenges in minority communities (from mistrust to internalized trauma) can be traced to those historical power abuses. Understanding this context is essential for tackling inequality: policies that aim to close racial gaps in income, education, health, or justice must account for the cumulative disadvantages born of history. The story of modern Britain cannot be separated from its imperial past; healing and progress require confronting that past so that the “transmission” of trauma and inequality can finally be broken, and a more equitable society built in its place ⁸² ⁸⁰ .

Sources: The World Health Organization ¹ ⁵ ; UK Home Office and NHS guidance ³ ⁶ ; Migration Observatory (Oxford) ¹⁵ ⁴⁷ ; Mental Health Foundation ⁹ ; South London & Maudsley NHS blog ⁴ ; *The Guardian* ⁸⁹ ⁶⁰ ; Al Jazeera News ²¹ ; UK Government reports ²⁰ ²⁵ ; Equality and Human Rights Commission ³⁰ ⁸² ; University of Sussex research on 2011 riots ³⁸ ³⁹ ; Yorkshire Bylines (economy analysis) ⁹⁰ ⁴⁹ ; Migration Observatory briefing 2025 ⁶² ⁶⁵ ; LSE research blog on slavery's trauma ⁴³ ³⁷ .

¹ ⁵ ⁷ ⁸ ¹¹ ¹² Refugee and migrant mental health

<https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/refugee-and-migrant-mental-health>

² ³ ⁶ ¹⁰ Mental health: migrant health guide - GOV.UK

<https://www.gov.uk/guidance/mental-health-migrant-health-guide>

⁴ ¹³ ¹⁴ Breaking Barriers to Migrant Communities and Mental Health Services | Our blog - South London and Maudsley

<https://slam.nhs.uk/blog/breaking-barriers-to-migrant-communities-and-mental-health-services-3763>

⁹ Refugees and asylum seekers: statistics | Mental Health Foundation

<https://www.mentalhealth.org.uk/explore-mental-health/statistics/refugees-asylum-seekers-statistics>

¹⁵ ¹⁶ The health of migrants in the UK - Migration Observatory - The Migration Observatory

<https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/briefings/the-health-of-migrants-in-the-uk/>

¹⁷ ⁸⁹ It's 20 years since the UK hit 'peak booze'. The hangover is still with us | Alcohol | The Guardian

<https://www.theguardian.com/society/2024/apr/27/its-20-years-since-the-uk-hit-peak-booze-the-hangover-is-still-with-us>

¹⁸ ¹⁹ ²⁰ ²³ ²⁴ SPI-B: Public disorder and public health - contemporary threats and risks, 2 July 2020 - GOV.UK

<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/spi-b-public-disorder-and-public-health-contemporary-threats-and-risks-2-july-2020/spi-b-public-disorder-and-public-health-contemporary-threats-and-risks-2-july-2020>

²¹ Scuffles, arrests as protesters across UK rally against asylum hotels | Refugees News | Al Jazeera

<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/8/24/scuffles-arrests-as-protesters-across-uk-rally-against-asylum-hotels>

²² Public Order - Hansard - UK Parliament

<https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2020-06-15/debates/88A5B876-13BE-4E00-ACBE-46CC62C179F2/PublicOrder>

²⁵ ²⁷ Hate crime, England and Wales, year ending March 2024 - GOV.UK

<https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/hate-crime-england-and-wales-year-ending-march-2024/hate-crime-england-and-wales-year-ending-march-2024>

²⁶ ²⁸ Victims of racial and religious hate crime - GOV.UK Ethnicity facts and figures

<https://www.ethnicity-facts-figures.service.gov.uk/crime-justice-and-the-law/crime-and-reoffending/victims-of-racial-and-religious-hate-crime/latest/>

²⁹ Workplace discrimination statistics in 2025 | Discrimination at work

<https://www.ciphr.com/infographics/workplace-discrimination-statistics>

30 31 32 33 34 81 82 84 85 86 Race report statistics | EHRC

<https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/our-work/our-research/race-report-statistics>

35 Migrants and discrimination in the UK - Migration Observatory - The Migration Observatory

<https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/briefings/migrants-and-discrimination-in-the-uk/>

36 37 43 79 80 87 The curse of slavery has left an intergenerational legacy of trauma and poor health for African Americans | USAPP

<https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/2019/03/08/the-curse-of-slavery-has-left-an-intergenerational-legacy-of-trauma-and-poor-health-for-african-americans/>

38 39 40 41 42 44 45 46 Analysing the 2011 riots: Why the emotional impact extended far beyond the affected communities : Broadcast: News items : University of Sussex

<https://www.sussex.ac.uk/broadcast/read/44794>

47 48 Migrants in the UK labour market: an overview - Migration Observatory - The Migration Observatory

<https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/briefings/migrants-in-the-uk-labour-market-an-overview/>

49 50 51 55 56 57 58 90 UK's ageing crisis: why immigration is an economic lifeline

<https://yorkshirebylines.co.uk/politics/uks-ageing-crisis-why-immigration-is-an-economic-lifeline/>

52 53 54 The UK's ageing population – what role does international migration play? | National Statistical

<https://blog.ons.gov.uk/2019/06/24/migration-ageing-population/>

59 60 61 International students boosted UK economy by £42bn in 2021/2 – study | International students | The Guardian

<https://www.theguardian.com/education/2023/may/16/international-students-boosted-uk-economy-by-42bn-in-2021-2-study>

62 63 64 65 66 67 68 71 72 73 74 75 76 Net migration to the UK - Migration Observatory - The Migration Observatory

<https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/briefings/long-term-international-migration-flows-to-and-from-the-uk/>

69 Asylum and refugee resettlement in the UK - Migration Observatory

<https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/briefings/migration-to-the-uk-asylum/>

70 The UK's asylum backlog - Migration Observatory

<https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/briefings/the-uks-asylum-backlog/>

77 78 88 The Scott Trust Legacies of Enslavement report | Legacies of Enslavement | The Guardian

<https://www.theguardian.com/the-scott-trust/ng-interactive/2023/mar/28/the-scott-trust-legacies-of-enslavement-report>

83 Employment, fairness at work, and enterprise - GOV.UK

<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-report-of-the-commission-on-race-and-ethnic-disparities/employment-fairness-at-work-and-enterprise>